Ming Yang picture

Ming Yang

Bio

Ming Yang is an Associate Professor of Economics and Finance at UCL. Ming has been working on various topics in finance, economics, and accounting, which share the central theme of strategic information acquisition/disclosure. In particular, he studies the role of information acquisition/disclosure in corporate finance, coordination games, incentive contract and monitoring, and accounting. He has published in the Review of Financial Studies, the Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, and the Journal of Accounting and Economics.

 

Research

Disclosure of Bank-Specific Information and the Stability of Financial Systems

Liang Dai, Dan Luo and Ming Yang
Review of Financial Studies (2024), 37(4), pp. 1315–1367 

 

Optimal Accounting Rules, Private Benefits of Control, and Efficient Liquidation

Xu Jiang and Ming Yang

Management Science (2024), 70(9), pp. 6302-6314

 

Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice

Stephen Morris and Ming Yang

Review of Economic Studies (2022), 89(5), pp.2687–2722

 

Optimality of Debt under Flexible Information Acquisition

Ming Yang

The Review of Economic Studies (2020), 87(1), pp.487-536

 

Optimal Incentive Contract with Endogenous Monitoring Technology

Anqi Li and Ming Yang

Theoretical Economics (2020), 15(3), pp.1135-1173

 

Financing Entrepreneurial Production: Security Design with Flexible Information Acquisition

Ming Yang and Yao Zeng

The Review of Financial Studies (2019), 32(3), pp.819-863

 

Properties of Optimal Accounting Rules in a Signaling Game

Xu Jiang and Ming Yang

Journal of Accounting and Economics (2017), 63(2-3), pp.499-512

 

Coordination with Flexible Information Acquisition

Ming Yang

Journal of Economic Theory (2015), 158, pp.721-738

 

Coordination and Fragility in Liquidity Provision

Ming Yang and Yao Zeng

Revise and Resubmit, the Review of Financial Studies

 

Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring

Liang Dai, Yenan Wang and Ming Yang

Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Economic Theory 

 

The Optimal Structure of Securities under Coordination Frictions

Dan Luo and Ming Yang

Reject and Resubmit, American Economic Review

 

Organizations and Spontaneous Order in Mitigating Strategic Uncertainty

Liang Dai and Ming Yang

 

Payments, Reserves, and Financial Fragility

Itay Goldstein, Ming Yang and Yao Zeng

 

Restoring Unanimity: The Role of Attention Allocation in Committee Decision-Making

Jidong Chen and Ming Yang

Revise and Resubmit, Quarterly Journal of Political Science

 

Flexible Monitoring, Double Moral Hazard, and Fixed-Wage Contracts

Liang Dai, Yenan Wang and Ming Yang

 

Insider Trading When There May Not Be an Insider

Liang Dai, Yenan Wang and Ming Yang

 

The Fragile Promise: Job Security and Contract Design under Partial Commitment

Liang Dai, Yenan Wang and Ming Yang