
Ming Yang
Bio
Ming Yang is an Associate Professor of Economics and Finance at UCL. Ming has been working on various topics in finance, economics, and accounting, which share the central theme of strategic information acquisition/disclosure. In particular, he studies the role of information acquisition/disclosure in corporate finance, coordination games, incentive contract and monitoring, and accounting. He has published in the Review of Financial Studies, the Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, and the Journal of Accounting and Economics.
Research
Disclosure of Bank-Specific Information and the Stability of Financial Systems
Liang Dai, Dan Luo and Ming Yang
Review of Financial Studies (2024), 37(4), pp. 1315–1367
Optimal Accounting Rules, Private Benefits of Control, and Efficient Liquidation
Xu Jiang and Ming Yang
Management Science (2024), 70(9), pp. 6302-6314
Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice
Stephen Morris and Ming Yang
Review of Economic Studies (2022), 89(5), pp.2687–2722
Optimality of Debt under Flexible Information Acquisition
Ming Yang
The Review of Economic Studies (2020), 87(1), pp.487-536
Optimal Incentive Contract with Endogenous Monitoring Technology
Anqi Li and Ming Yang
Theoretical Economics (2020), 15(3), pp.1135-1173
Financing Entrepreneurial Production: Security Design with Flexible Information Acquisition
Ming Yang and Yao Zeng
The Review of Financial Studies (2019), 32(3), pp.819-863
Properties of Optimal Accounting Rules in a Signaling Game
Xu Jiang and Ming Yang
Journal of Accounting and Economics (2017), 63(2-3), pp.499-512
Coordination with Flexible Information Acquisition
Ming Yang
Journal of Economic Theory (2015), 158, pp.721-738
Coordination and Fragility in Liquidity Provision
Ming Yang and Yao Zeng
Revise and Resubmit, the Review of Financial Studies
Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring
Liang Dai, Yenan Wang and Ming Yang
Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Economic Theory
The Optimal Structure of Securities under Coordination Frictions
Dan Luo and Ming Yang
Reject and Resubmit, American Economic Review
Organizations and Spontaneous Order in Mitigating Strategic Uncertainty
Liang Dai and Ming Yang
Payments, Reserves, and Financial Fragility
Itay Goldstein, Ming Yang and Yao Zeng
Restoring Unanimity: The Role of Attention Allocation in Committee Decision-Making
Jidong Chen and Ming Yang
Revise and Resubmit, Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Flexible Monitoring, Double Moral Hazard, and Fixed-Wage Contracts
Liang Dai, Yenan Wang and Ming Yang
Insider Trading When There May Not Be an Insider
Liang Dai, Yenan Wang and Ming Yang
The Fragile Promise: Job Security and Contract Design under Partial Commitment
Liang Dai, Yenan Wang and Ming Yang